

1 **Using the Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed: potential benefits and**
2 **problems on data interpretation**

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10 **Abstract**

11 The Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed (RASFF), where competent authorities in each Member
12 State (MS) submit notifications on the withdrawal of unsafe or illegal products from the market,
13 makes a significant contribution to food safety control in the European Union. The aim of this paper
14 is to frame the potential challenges of interpreting and then acting upon the dataset contained within
15 the RASFF system. As it is largest cause of RASFF notifications, the lens of enquiry used is
16 mycotoxin contamination. The methodological approach is to firstly iteratively review existing
17 literature to frame the problem, and then to interrogate the RASFF system and analyse the data
18 available. Findings are that caution should be exercised in using the RASFF database both as a
19 predictive tool and for trend analysis, because iterative changes in food law impact on the frequency
20 of regulatory sampling associated with border and inland regulatory checks. The study highlights the
21 variability of engagement by MSs with the RASFF database, influencing generalisability of the trends
22 noted. As importing countries raise market standards, there are wider food safety implications for the
23 exporting countries themselves. As this is one of the first studies articulating the complexities and
24 opportunities of using the RASFF database, this research makes a strong contribution to literature.

25 **Keywords: food safety, food security, RASFF, mycotoxins, sampling**

26 **1. Background**

27 **1.1 Introduction**

28 The dominant role of information as a product of a modern economy and a determinant of
29 business decisions is often articulated. Thus, when organisations, and the individuals that work for
30 them, are seeking access to sources of information on instances of non-compliance with food law
31 they should consider with care both the source of data, and how they intend to use it. There are many
32 examples of databases developed to contain data on food law non-compliance. These databases
33 include the European Union (EU) Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed (RASFF), the EU Food
34 Fraud Network & Administrative Assistance and Cooperation System (EU FFN & AAC), the former
35 US Pharmacopoeia (USP) Food Fraud Mitigation Database that has evolved to the Decernis Food
36 Fraud Database (Decernis, 2019), and HorizonScan (Fera, 2019). These databases evolve from the
37 joint activities of governments and the private sector, and via emergent digital tools that gather data
38 from multiple sources, including information from official food controls, and the broadly defined
39 media (Bouzembrak et al. 2018; Kowalska, 2019; Manning & Soon, 2019). This paper specifically
40 focuses on the RASFF Database.

41 **1.2 RASFF Database**

42 Multiple studies have analysed RASFF data for incident frequency and trends (Kleter et al.
43 2009; Taylor et al. 2013; Tähkäpää et al. 2015; Bouzembrak & Marvin, 2016; Marvin et al. 2016;
44 Djekic et al. 2017; Kowalska et al. 2018). However, not so many of these studies underline the need
45 to interpret the data cautiously based on the nature of the data collection methods, which forms the
46 research rationale for this study. Manning and Soon (2018, p. 132), in their study on food smuggling
47 and trafficking, underlined that “purposive sampling means the [RASFF] data does not reflect the
48 true incidence, extent and type of illegal imports especially by individuals for personal use”. Pádua
49 et al. (2019), in their study on the impact of Regulation (EU) No 1169/2011 on allergen-related recalls
50 in RASFF, state that “although this provides official and controlled data, which can be used in risk

51 analysis, they are restricted to the control activities from which they result and cannot be used in
52 predictions of occurrences with food allergens.”

53 The European Commission (EC) developed the RASFF system in 1979 and since then, the
54 system, through continuous service (24/7), has been the cornerstone of the food safety regulatory
55 control system and has ensured that urgent notifications are reported and answered collectively
56 between all EU countries, as well as Norway, Liechtenstein, Iceland, and Switzerland. Food safety is
57 the condition of foodstuffs in all stages of production, processing and distribution, required to
58 guarantee protection of consumers’ health, also taking into account normal circumstances of use, and
59 the information available for the foodstuffs concerned (Baert et al. 2011). Food safety is only about
60 controlling chemical, physical and microbiological hazards to minimise the risk to public health, it is
61 also a crucial social, environmental and economic issue. Food safety is a fundamental foundation of
62 food security, where the latter addresses “ensuring the availability and accessibility of nutritious food,
63 for all people at all times to live a healthy life” (Gross et al. 2000). The value of the RASFF database
64 particularly for underpinning food safety and wider regulatory compliance of food in Europe is the
65 obligatory nature of Member State (MS) participation; the system’s 24-hour operation, rapid reaction
66 and action criteria, the quality of the metadata provided, its “free to use” accessibility and ease-of-
67 use. The RASFF portal is therefore a key tool to ensure the flow of information to enable a swift
68 reaction when risks to public health are detected in the food supply chain. The process aims to
69 minimise the public health effect of trading any food that is unsafe, hazardous or does not comply
70 with labelling or information supplied with the product.

71 The EC is a member and a manager of the RASFF system (EU, 2018). In combination with
72 the actions overseen by the EC and related agencies, a strong commitment from the industry and
73 government to improve the integrity and assurance of food supply networks, and a determination to
74 protect consumers is expected. There is an imperative to build strong global institutions that exercise
75 common food governance through encouraging authoritative bodies and regulatory institutions to
76 cooperate together with private organisations within supply chains. This cooperative approach means

77 that a wide range of governance activities can be undertaken jointly by the private and the state sector
78 (Spink et al. 2016; Verbruggen, 2016; Verbruggen & Havinga, 2017), where these authors term this
79 approach as the *hybridisation* of food policy. Despite the efforts of regulators and the private sector
80 to develop and implement systems to manage food safety, consumer food poisoning and foodborne
81 illness outbreaks still occur, and remain an important source of communicable and non-
82 communicable human disease (Manning, 2017a). Indeed, food safety failures are recognised by
83 governments as a major social and economic risk, threatening consumer health, producing
84 inefficiencies in animal and plant production systems, and creating trade barriers across the global
85 food system (Kendall et al. 2018). In summary, the RASFF database and the associated notification
86 processes are a useful mechanism for keeping European citizens informed and safer, and making the
87 European food industry more competitive.

88 **1.3 Regulatory and hybrid control systems**

89 Current policy measures aimed at preventing, managing and mitigating food safety risk can
90 be divided into two groups. These are: (1) **ex ante preventative measures**, including the
91 development of food safety management systems and food traceability systems; and (2) **ex post**
92 **reactive measures** including control measures undertaken by national food protection agencies to
93 address a specific incident. These measures designed to protect public health include the use of rapid
94 alert systems and information technology systems developed to exchange data regarding non-
95 compliances and identifying quickly any potential intentional violations of agri-food chain legislation
96 (Kowalska, 2019).

97 There are regions and states for example where the private sector is very strong in food control
98 activities, e.g. the United Kingdom (UK), or alternatively countries such as Poland that mostly rely
99 on public governance. As the structure, efficiency and degree of public/private hybridisation of the
100 food control system is historically, structurally, and culturally conditioned this limits the opportunity
101 to develop official food control system instruments that are universal. At the same time, global market

102 dynamics are driving a decreasing number of larger and larger global transnational corporations who
103 are responsible for the world's food supply. Transnational corporations as part of their corporate
104 compliance processes develop common food safety standards across their operating base especially
105 in countries that lack a public official food control system. Good practices and solutions from
106 particular trading regions are then tailored for given operating situations. The food safety governance
107 structures within these corporations therefore have a stronger and stronger impact on the level of food
108 safety and food legality.

109 Transnational corporations are motivated to invest in private standards and systems to reduce
110 shareholder, consumer and business risk (Manning, 2018). Thus, the market environment creates a
111 juxtaposition between self-interest, deontological and virtuous behaviour requiring investment in
112 food traceability, food authenticity and guarding against food crime (Hoorfar et al. 2011; Davidson
113 et al. 2017; Manning, 2017b; Fox et al. 2018; Manning, 2018; Kowalska, 2019). The corporate focus
114 is on the protection of the economic interests of the consumer with respect to food safety and quality,
115 and ensuring fair business practices (Korzycka & Wojciechowski, 2017). However, their strong
116 market orientation towards shareholders' interests reflects an ethical dilemma if these interests are at
117 odds with the interests of the consumer (Adamowicz, 2015; Kowalczyk, 2017). It can be argued that
118 consumer interest in terms of food safety and food security is a public good that a purely market
119 mechanism cannot supply. Even within hybrid models of food governance, society, albeit through a
120 culturally contextualised frame, still expects the State, as a regulator, creator and guardian of social
121 and economic order, to ensure food is safe and wholesome (Kowalska, 2019). For instance, due to
122 the dominant regulatory culture of Polish food control bodies, the system lacks adaptive capacity in
123 the face of changing legal, technology and market environments, and also is weak in learning from
124 regulatory approaches in other countries (Jendza, 2016). Whilst Weber (2002) finds many benefits of
125 bureaucratic organisations, the bureaucratic model of official food control bodies in Poland creates
126 barriers to the cooperation between public and private organisations which is necessary for effective
127 food safety governance (Verbruggen, 2016; Verbruggen, & Havinga, 2017). This demonstrates that

128 even countries historically under the collective umbrella of EU legislation, such as the UK and
129 Poland, can have very varied regulatory approaches and thus may utilise the RASFF system in
130 different ways.

131 A more market orientated policy approach to food safety focuses on risk. In this regard, both
132 EU and United States (US) food policy has increasingly focused on minimising food safety risks and
133 associated hazards. Kendall et al. (2018) determine that a systems approach to identifying, managing
134 and mitigating food safety risk represents a useful policy tool. Indeed making the hazard analysis
135 critical control point (HACCP) approach compulsory post-harvest and post slaughter via regulatory
136 levers was a milestone in such food safety policy (Manning, Luning & Wallace, 2019). Food safety
137 management programmes derived from this approach generally focus on the unintentional
138 contamination of food by known ingredients, pathogens, mishandling, or processing, but more
139 recently the issue of intentional adulteration of food is gaining importance (Soon et al. 2019). To
140 counter existing and emerging food safety risks effectively, key economic, environmental and cultural
141 drivers of risk must be identified and these may vary across and between countries.

142 Since 2000, the Global Food Safety Initiative (GFSI) too has been playing a major role in
143 “promoting a harmonised approach with a shared vision of safe food for consumers everywhere”.
144 The initiative is a world-leading institution in food safety governance; demonstrating private meta-
145 regulation and it provides a benchmarking standard for food safety (Verbruggen & Havinga, 2014).
146 All major transnational private food safety standards are recognised by the GFSI, including the
147 Primus GFS Standard, Global Aquaculture Alliance Seafood, GlobalG.A.P. Produce Safety Standard,
148 GlobalG.A.P. Integrated Farm Assurance Scheme, Global Red Meat Standard, SQF Code, IFS Food
149 Standard, IFS PACsecure, IFS Logistics, BRC Global Standard for Food Safety, BRC Global
150 Standard for Packaging and Packaging Materials, BRC Global Standard for Storage and Distribution,
151 BAP Seafood Processing Standard, FSSC 22000, Canada GAP, and China HACCP
152 (PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), 2017). Kendall et al. (2018) advocate this international
153 harmonisation of food safety standards globally. As well as through private co-operation and

154 consolidation of supply chain standards, harmonisation of approach can also be delivered through the
155 mechanism of the United Nations Codex Alimentarius Commission derived international food safety
156 standards and protocols.

157 **1.4 Transparency and traceability**

158 The principle of transparency required under Community law means that traceability has
159 gained considerable importance with regard to food, particularly following a number of food safety
160 incidents during which traceability systems have been shown to be weak or absent (Aung & Chang,
161 2014). Food traceability systems are perceived as effective elements of safety and quality systems
162 and have the potential, in the event of a product recall, to improve safety within food chains, as well
163 as to increase consumer confidence and to connect producers and consumers. Traceability systems
164 should be established at all stages of production, processing and distribution of both animal and plant
165 food products. Traceability contributes to managing risks related to food safety and plant/animal
166 health issues, guaranteeing product authenticity, providing credible information to customers, and
167 improving food quality by identifying the batches that potentially affected by a given non-
168 compliance. Food scandals from the 80s and 90s such as Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE)
169 made products of animal origin (POAO) the main subject of the EU food law provisions (Kowalczyk,
170 2015). Thus, EU food traceability legislation covering POAO is much more comprehensive than the
171 regulatory controls developed for foods of plant origin (Charlebois et al. 2014), otherwise defined as
172 products not of animal origin or PNOAO. Since 2011, the scope of the TRAdE Control and Expert
173 System (TRACES), a multilingual online management tool that is used to notify, certify and monitor
174 trade in animals and POAO has been enlarged through the launch of new modules for the control of
175 feed and food of non-animal origin, as well as of plants, seeds and propagating material.

176 Regulation (EU) No 2017/625 known as the “Official Control Regulation” requires an
177 integrated approach to the use of information management tools, which is why preparatory work was
178 started to integrate food related EU-managed IT systems. These systems include the TRACES and

179 the IT systems supporting the EU's alert systems (RASFF/AAC and EUROPHYT) through to the
180 Information Management System for Official Control (IMSOC) (RASFF, 2018). Such integration
181 should lead to the development of a better and more efficient communication system, hence more
182 effective surveillance of food safety, enabling more efficient use of the available data, and reducing
183 the administration costs associated with maintaining the former individual IT systems (TRACES,
184 RASFF, AAC, EUROPHYT). The integration will also support the optimisation of regulatory
185 resources, improve management control and as a result lead to an overall increase in performance.
186 The aim of this e-government system is ultimately to ensure traceability, information exchange and
187 risk management both within the EU and for imports from non-EU countries (EU, 2016).

188 **1.4 Food safety and its interaction with food security**

189 Unsafe food cannot be placed lawfully on the market, and potentially cannot be used as animal
190 feed or for energy generation, and if this is the case the food must be disposed of and as a result
191 becomes waste. Even if mislabelled food is re-worked or re-distributed to other destinations, much
192 of the original economic, social and environmental value is lost. Food safety incidents, food fraud,
193 and other market imperfections/food integrity incidents cost the global economy billions of euros a
194 year. Thomson et al. (2012) determine the costs of multiple product recall incidents such as the 2008
195 Irish pork dioxin incident costing more than €4 million; and the previous 1999 Belgian dioxin incident
196 causing a loss to the economy of €2 billion as non-inflation indexed examples. Effective management
197 of food safety at the European level, such as through the use of the RASFF System will make
198 identifying distribution routes for non-compliant foods and monitoring the potential status of food
199 batches far easier thus limiting the economic burden of such recalls and wider public health costs.
200 These include: public health treatment costs; export bans and embargoes; food recall/withdrawal and
201 disposal costs and incident investigation costs; an increase in insurance premiums; fines for non-
202 supply; a fall in share price or brand value and a loss of consumer and customer trust (Galvin-King
203 et al. 2018; Kowalska & Kowalski, 2018; Manning, 2018; Renko et al. 2019).

204 More esoterically, the safety, availability and nutrition of food ranks among the fundamental
205 needs for human life, affecting human health and wellbeing and increasing the length and quality of
206 life (Wiśniewska, 2017; Lehotay, 2018). EU food law focuses on maintaining a high level of
207 protection of human health and life through ensuring food security for all and integrity in terms of
208 the practices in the supply chain, highlighting a wider context of the rights of individuals to safe,
209 affordable, and nutritionally suitable food that meets all legal criteria. Unsafe foodstuffs can cause
210 disease, illness and malnutrition, particularly affecting vulnerable groups such as pregnant women,
211 infants, young children, the elderly and the sick. Malnutrition affects most of the world's population,
212 all geographies, all age groups, rich and poor, men and women. There are many forms of malnutrition:
213 from undernutrition, stunting and wasting in children under five, micronutrient deficiencies, moderate
214 and severe thinness or underweight in adults, and conversely overweight and obesity in both children
215 and adults (Global Nutrition Report, 2019). Every year, one in ten people in the world fall ill after
216 eating contaminated food, and 420,000 die (WHO, 2017). Flynn et al. (2018) have rightly emphasised
217 that "keeping the food supply safe is a never-ending task". The Global Food Security Index is a useful
218 quantitative measure to assess the efficiency of the food security system and by implication the food
219 safety governance of a given country (<https://foodsecurityindex.eiu.com/>). The index is based on 28
220 indicators grouped into three categories: affordability, availability, and finally quality and safety. The
221 quality and safety score is composed of five indicators: diet diversification, nutritional standards,
222 micronutrient availability, protein quality, and food safety. Food safety as an indicator is further
223 composed of three sub-indicators, (i) the existence of an agency that ensures the health/safety of food,
224 (ii) access to potable water, and (iii) the presence of a formal grocery sector (Chammem et al. 2018).
225 In 2018 amongst 113 countries, Singapore, Ireland, the UK, the United States (US) and the
226 Netherlands scored the highest overall Global Food Security Index score value with Singapore rated
227 first in terms of affordability, the UK rated first in terms of availability, and France, Finland, the US
228 and Australia ahead in terms of food quality and safety. Sierra Leone, Yemen, Madagascar, Congo
229 (Dem. Rep.) and Burundi scored the lowest Global Food Security Index value, but Mozambique was

230 rated last in terms of food quality and safety (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2019). Unfortunately,
231 there is not a Global Food Security Index calculated for all countries and European absentees in the
232 list include Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, which limits the value of the index in terms of cross-
233 comparison especially in the Eastern Europe context.

234 **2. Mycotoxins: a case study**

235 Why are mycotoxins of particular importance when considering food safety and food security
236 and reflecting on the role of the RASFF system in the hybridised food safety governance systems of
237 the EU? Mycotoxins are natural contaminants of food and feed produced mainly by moulds and fungi
238 of the genera *Aspergillus*, *Penicillium*, *Fusarium* and *Alternaria*. Mycotoxins (including aflatoxins,
239 Ochratoxin A, and Fusarium toxins) are secondary metabolites that exert adverse negative effects
240 both on human and animal health and may contaminate agricultural food products of vegetable and
241 animal origin leading particularly to a loss of efficiency in animal production systems (WHO, 2018).
242 Estimates suggest that 25%-35% of the world's crops including rice, cereals and nuts, are damaged
243 by mould or fungal growth representing around 1 billion metric tonnes of food lost per annum (Pandya
244 & Arade, 2016; Avery et al. 2019; Gbashi et al. 2019). As a result of the associated food loss,
245 mycotoxin contamination presents a modern day challenge to food security in many countries as well
246 as a chronic public health issue for those that consume foods contaminated with mycotoxins.

247 Due to the potential risk of contamination of some products by aflatoxins, the EC introduced
248 special conditions governing certain foodstuffs imported from certain third countries (Commission
249 Decision 2006/504/EC). For instance, Commission Regulation (EC) No 669/2009 of 24 July 2009
250 implementing Regulation (EC) No 882/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council as
251 regards the increased level of official controls on imports of certain feed and food of non-animal
252 origin and amending Decision 2006/504/EC provides for an increased frequency of regulatory
253 controls (**50% of all consignments**) to be carried out for the presence of **aflatoxins** in peanuts and
254 derived products originating from Brazil and Ghana; basmati rice for direct human consumption from

255 Pakistan; melon (egusi) seeds and derived products from Nigeria; specific spices from India, and
256 requirements for determining the presence of Ochratoxin A in dried vine fruit from Uzbekistan.
257 Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 884/2014 of 13 August 2014 imposing special
258 conditions governing the import of certain feed and food from certain third countries due to
259 contamination risk by aflatoxins and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1152/2009 states that competent
260 authorities shall carry out checks by taking a sample for analysis of total **aflatoxin contamination**
261 for food on certain consignments **at a 50% frequency**, i.e. pistachios and derived products from Iran
262 and Turkey, peanuts and derived products from Ghana, and watermelon seeds and derived products
263 from Nigeria.

264 Mycotoxins can be present on agricultural commodities in the field, before harvest, post-
265 harvest, during processing, packaging, distribution, and storage. Inappropriate or a lack of storage
266 conditions and other environmental factors such as high temperature, high relative humidity and
267 moisture may trigger mycotoxin formation (Cotty & Jaime-Garcia, 2007; Yeni et al. 2016; Baines et
268 al. 2018; Zinedine & El Akhdari, 2019) especially if there is inadequate cleaning and handling
269 processes and post-harvest drying techniques (Kabak & Dobson, 2017; Schmidt, 2017; Baines et al.
270 2018). Mycotoxins are more of a concern in warmer, subtropical and tropical areas than in the
271 temperate areas of the world (Wilson et al. 2002). Mycotoxins are then transported across countries
272 to other food markets via food supply chains (De Ruyck et al. 2015). In summary, due to their toxicity,
273 and carcinogenicity, mycotoxins are of public health interest from both a food safety and a food
274 security and economic perspective (Zinedine & Mañes, 2009; Barac, 2019; Bessaire et al. 2019;
275 Ünüsan, 2019). Mycotoxin contamination can be used as a research lens not only to consider food
276 safety in itself, but also public health more generally and issues of wider integrity of food supply
277 chains and the impact of a food safety concern on local, national and global food security. This gives
278 rise to several research questions:

279 RQ1: Does the nature of the purposive sampling process influence the RASFF dataset and as
280 a result limit the conclusions that can be drawn from the data it contains?

281 RQ2: Can the RASFF dataset be used to determine risk associated with a given hazard?

282 The aim of the paper is to frame the challenges of interpretation and acting upon the dataset
283 contained within the RASFF system with specific emphasis on mycotoxin contamination. Due to it
284 being the largest reason for RASFF notifications, the lens of enquiry used is mycotoxin
285 contamination. This approach will give insights into the value of the RASFF database for competent
286 authorities, food organisations and individual members of the public as both a data source and as a
287 management tool to drive corrective action to optimise public health and wellbeing. An understanding
288 of the data and the inherent trends that are reported within the RASFF dataset over time and what this
289 means in practice for the RASFF system as a source of information for risk assessment, risk
290 management and risk communication is considered. The impact of raising import standards in one
291 trading block on the food safety and food security of the exporting country itself is also considered.

292 **3. Materials and methods**

293 The methodological approach is to firstly iteratively review existing literature to frame the
294 research questions, and then using mycotoxin notifications as an example, to interrogate the RASFF
295 data system and analyse the data available in order to consider the research questions posed. We
296 searched the following databases: Science Direct, Google Scholar, Google (to include grey literature)
297 to primarily consider current information on food safety, food security and mycotoxin contamination.
298 The key search terms are shown in Table 1. The terms were used in a range of combinations of the
299 search terms i.e. through an iterative literature review method. Iterative literature review is grounded
300 by a foundational literature search using a series of iterative searches. In undertaking the searches for
301 a given combination of search terms the first 100 items in each search are considered for relevancy
302 and any duplication. All relevant papers were then collected and the titles and abstracts read. The
303 papers were then read in full (n=65) and screened for relevance and value in supporting a discursive
304 narrative and argument. Fifty papers were used to support the primary narrative in the paper.

305 **Take in Table 1**

306 RASFF members are obliged to notify and to exchange information on food and feed safety
307 issues and measures. The notifications reported in RASFF are generally available through the official
308 portal, which features an interactive, searchable on-line database that includes detailed information
309 on each notification, including the type, date, and reason for the notification, the hazard(s) and the
310 nature of the product(s) involved, and the country of notification and origin (Pádua et al. 2019). The
311 RASFF notification type is determined by three fields: (1) product type (food, feed or food contact
312 material), (2) notification classification (alert, information, border rejection), and (3) notification
313 basis, indicating what type of control, report or investigation lay at the basis of the notification (border
314 control, official control on the market, company internal-check, consumer complaint, food poisoning)
315 (RASFF Portal, 2019). A notification is classified as an ‘alert’ and is triggered when the food, feed
316 or food contact material presents a serious risk on the market and rapid action is or might be required,
317 generally aimed at withdrawing the product from the market. An ‘information notification’ concerns
318 a food that does not require rapid action, either because the product is not on the market at the time
319 of the report or the risk is low. A ‘border rejection notification’ is created when a foodstuff is
320 prevented from entering the EU because it is considered to jeopardise food or feed safety (Kowalska
321 et al. 2018; Pádua et al. 2019; RASFF Portal, 2019).

322 An initial search of the RASFF database highlights that one of the highest frequency of food
323 related notifications is that associated with mycotoxins and more specifically aflatoxins. The RASFF
324 food dataset over the period 01/01/2004-31/12/2018 is analysed. This timeframe is chosen because
325 due to EU enlargement in May 2004 the number of MSs contributing to RASFF increased
326 fundamentally, and using this dataset eliminates the potential for the findings to be influenced by this
327 structural change. Further, the categorisation of action categories has changed over the time period
328 assessed, limiting some elements of cross-comparison. Current and obsolete action categories are
329 identified in the data analysis within the results section. The descriptive analysis of the data from
330 RASFF were performed (frequency and percentages of the sample population) using Excel 2016. The
331 instances of mycotoxin contamination were identified and then these were coded by product category

332 and country. The influence of purposive sampling in light of the aforementioned the EU aflatoxin
333 regulations plays a role here. The statutory sampling requirements of these regulations have evolved
334 over time and thus influenced the value of the conclusions that can be derived from the data. Manning
335 and Soon (2019) provide a wider discussion on the impact of sampling type on dataset validity and
336 usability.

337 **4. Results and analysis**

338 Between September 1979 and May 2019, there were 49,522 RASFF notifications regarding
339 food products. Analysis of RASFF data from the period 1979-2019 revealed that there were over
340 13,000 food safety incidents for POAO, and almost double this figure for foods of plant origin
341 (RASFF Portal, 2019). This may be a factor of the enlargement of the TRACES System, to include
342 feed and food of non-animal origin, as well as of plants, seeds and propagating material (EU, 2016).
343 The rate of notification from different MSs varies allowing some countries data to influence the
344 overall representativeness of the data for the context within all MSs (Petróczi et al. 2010; Taylor et
345 al. 2013). Taylor et al. (2013) analysed RASFF notifications issued between 2003 and 2007, and
346 found major variations among MSs in their relative contributions to the RASFF database. In 2016-
347 2017, the most RASFF notifications came from Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Germany, the UK,
348 France, Poland and Belgium, whereas Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were situated in the bottom ten
349 countries (EU, 2017; EU, 2018).

350 Once identified, unsafe or mislabelled food cannot be legally sold in the EU, thus MSs must
351 take appropriate action following a RASFF notification. The types of action taken have been
352 determined from the database for the timeframe analysed (2004-2018) in order to gain a clearer
353 picture of the economic, environmental and social implications of such interventions (Table 2). The
354 most common actions carried out in connection with the wide variety of RASSF notifications within
355 the studied period 2004-2018 were: re-dispatch, product recall or withdrawal, and destruction with
356 the associated environmental impact.

357 **Take in Table 2**

358 With a particular focus on mycotoxins, the most frequent 2004-2018 RASFF notifications
359 regarding food products (n=42181) related to the hazard category **mycotoxins** (n=9522) see Table 3
360 and Table 4. A tenth of the mycotoxins incidents were alerts with rapid action required. Other
361 common food safety issues reported in RASFF over the period 2004-2018 were related to the presence
362 of pathogenic microorganisms (n=5680) and high levels of pesticides residues (n=3949). Indeed these
363 three categories together with microbial contamination other represent half of the notifications in
364 Table 2.

365 **Take in Table 3**

366 An analysis of mycotoxin related incidents by product as a percentage of the total number of
367 ‘mycotoxins hazards’ shows that the most notified product belonged to the category ‘nuts, nut
368 products and seeds’ (72.79%), and then products were from the category ‘fruits and vegetables’
369 (12.97%) see Table 4. This compared with the most frequently notified product categories in the
370 RASFF dataset between 2004 and 2018 being also ‘nuts, nut products and seeds’ (23.36%), and then
371 products were from the category ‘fruits and vegetables’ (17.32%), fish and fish products (12.31%).
372 Most of the notifications for nuts, nut products and seeds related to the hazard category ‘mycotoxins’.
373 One third of RASFF notifications for herbs and spices, 21% of the notifications for cereals and bakery
374 products and 17% of RASFF notifications for fruits and vegetables related to the hazard category
375 ‘mycotoxins’ (Table 4). Mycotoxins being identified as a “hazard” was much less frequent in the
376 other food product categories.

377 **Take in Table 4**

378 The high level of notifications related to the hazard category ‘mycotoxins’ and especially for
379 the category ‘nuts, nut products and seeds’ is due to the purposive sampling associated with EU
380 legislation, especially Commission Regulation (EC) No 669/2009 and Commission Implementing
381 Regulation (EU) No 884/2014 (Table 3). The effects of this policy on the trends identified in the

382 database are evident when we analyse the share for food products in the hazard category ‘mycotoxins’
383 of **border rejections** as a total within RASFF notifications (Figure 1).

384 Since 2008 when the new “border rejections” type of RASFF notification was added, the vast
385 majority of RASFF notifications for food in the hazard category ‘mycotoxins’ were border rejections
386 (86.6% in 2008, 82% in 2009, 85.8% in 2010, 79.5% in 2011, 80.7% in 2012, 70.7% in 2013, 75.6%
387 in 2014, 79% in 2015, 76.9% in 2016, 80.3% in 2017, and 77.3% in 2018). Can it be assumed that
388 nuts, seeds and derived products are the most commonly contaminated food products presented at EU
389 borders? Caution is required while considering this question because nuts and seeds, as shown, are
390 subject to more frequent regulatory checks than many other food product types, demonstrating a
391 weakness in being able to draw conclusions from this dataset. This is important in the context of
392 implementing “risk-based” regulation where the possible drivers of RASFF notifications over the
393 years might be complex and varied. Even in this research, the list of products subject to more frequent
394 regulatory sampling is considered thus creating a limitation here too in terms of wider generalisability.

395 **Take in Figure 1**

396 When we analyse the number of RASFF notifications related to mycotoxins **by notifying country**
397 over the period 2004-2018, we can observe considerable differences among the results (Figure 2).
398 Germany notified the most food safety incidents associated with mycotoxins over this period
399 (n=2624). This is followed by the Netherlands (n=1645), the UK (n=1563), Italy (n=1338), Spain
400 (n=1005) and France (n=894). Some MSs contribute far fewer results, i.e. Ireland (n=98), Lithuania
401 (n=77), Norway (n=58), Hungary (n=49), Malta (n=47), Luxemburg (n=46), Romania (n=41),
402 Croatia (n=32), Latvia (n=27), and Estonia (n=15).

403 **Take in Figure 2**

404 Analysis of this data means that for both research questions the answer is that the nature of
405 the purposive sampling process does influence the RASFF dataset and as a result limit the conclusions
406 that can be drawn from the data it contains (RQ1). Further, the RASFF dataset cannot, due to the

407 purposive nature of the data collection, be used to determine risk associated with a given food safety
408 hazard.

409 **5. Discussion**

410 Food recalls, food rejections and associated food waste impact on food security in many nations
411 in the world. Recent research has begun to highlight the fungal threat to food security (Avery et al.
412 2019; Moretti et al. 2019; Gbashi et al. 2019). Indeed, Avery et al. (2019) argue that investment in
413 innovative research strategies, international, inter-disciplinary collaboration and associated policy
414 levers are essential to control fungal growth and limit its impact on food security. A programme of
415 regulatory mycotoxin screening and an associated database within RASFF is thus a key tool to use to
416 promote such activities. Paster & Barkai-Golan (2008) highlight that the stringent regulatory controls
417 around mycotoxins may lead to the countries that are seeking to export to the EU being faced with
418 import bans and the loss of essential markets. The reduction in value can be seen with lower
419 commodity prices and greater costs of inspection, checking and testing, greater costs for disposal,
420 rejection or product treatment as well as compensation for claims made by customers (Gbashi et al.
421 2019). This, Paster & Barkai-Golan argue, could mean that such countries export the portion of
422 commodities that will meet these stringent EU standards to the EU itself, whilst inferior products are
423 consumed in the domestic market, or at the rural household level affecting local food safety standards
424 and public health at the rural household scale. Indeed a study by Otsuki et al. (2001) suggests that a
425 10% tighter aflatoxin standard in the EU will reduce EU edible groundnut imports by 11% thus
426 lowering trade flows from countries who rely heavily on the export trade. Gbashi et al. (2019) concur
427 stating that exports of nuts, cereals, oil seeds and dried goods could fall by as much as 64% and lead
428 to a loss of brand value as a result. This creates a challenge concerning the potential negative
429 externalities of setting of regulatory and market standards in one global market and the resultant
430 impact on the domestic markets that are differentiating their commodity products into different
431 “value” chains i.e. what they can export and then what can be consumed in the domestic market by
432 humans or livestock (Misihairabgwi et al. 2019). At a more basic food security level, increasing

433 export market standards can influence what food can access the export market and the local market
434 and what food is left to be eaten by the household as it is “not fit” for sale.

435 Actors along the supply chain in low and middle income countries have a low level of incentives
436 to improve food safety in the supply chain and the public sector lack both capacity and resources to
437 enforce regulations, if they exist (Hoffmann et al. 2019). Where toxicity and carcinogenicity of
438 mycotoxins is proven as a public health issue, it is questionable whether the setting of different food
439 safety standards in various countries is morally right (Zinedine & Mañes, 2009; Barac, 2019; Bessaire
440 et al. 2019; Ünüsan, 2019). Further, in some studies observed differences in gut microbiomes were
441 unique to specific locations and lifestyle (Yatsunenکو et al. 2012). Liew and Mohd-Redzwan (2018)
442 revealed that the gut microbiota is capable of eliminating mycotoxin from the host (human or animal)
443 naturally, provided the host is healthy with a balanced gut microbiota. However, this is not the case
444 with those having a lower quality of diet. In Southern Africa, chronic mycotoxin exposure has been
445 linked to malnutrition, impaired growth, higher disease incidence e.g. hepatitis B virus, cancer, and
446 neural tube defects amongst other health impacts (Misihairabgwi et al. 2019). In sub-Saharan Africa,
447 around 250,000 hepatocellular carcinoma-related deaths due to aflatoxin toxicity occur per year
448 (Wagacha & Muthomi, 2008) showing this balance between food quality, food safety and meeting
449 food security needs (Mwalwayo & Thole, 2016). Indeed in times of extreme food insecurity,
450 Wielogorska et al. (2018) argue that calorie intake is prioritised before the food safety issues
451 associated with mycotoxins. Sirma et al. (2018) in their work on Sub-Saharan food security ask
452 whether there is a trade-off between ensuring food availability and increased focus on food safety
453 risk or is food security compromised by food safety policy? In policy terms, is absolute food safety a
454 realistic social goal, where food is scarce and is there a regulatory relativity with respect to aflatoxins?
455 How much does the lack of awareness of health implications of mycotoxins influence consumption
456 behaviour in countries where the population is at risk of food insecurity? Sirma et al.’s study
457 highlights differentiated aflatoxin standards across four African countries and the juxtaposition
458 between ever increasing food standards and the “realities that make compliance impossible” i.e. the

459 challenges of the creation of un-workable market standards where the ability to create food standards
460 and regulatory policy exceeds the ability of governments to effectively implement them. Whilst
461 regulatory authorities may set maximum mycotoxin levels, these regulations are simply not effective
462 in subsistence farming communities where food is produced for direct consumption (Alberts et al.
463 2019). Further, Beed (2012) asserts that it is essential to prevent the ‘dumping’ of mycotoxin
464 contaminated food e.g. consignments that have failed to gain entry into EU markets into local and
465 non-regulated African markets. Dumping practice can therefore be driven by increasing standards in
466 some trading blocks.

467 Dumping is when an “exporter” exports its product at a price (i.e. the ‘export price’) which is
468 below the price the product is usually sold for in the destination market (i.e. the ‘normal value’) thus
469 impacting on the economic market and often causing organisational failure for domestic supply
470 (Sibanda, 2015). Therefore, dumping mycotoxin contaminated food into the African human food
471 chain during acute and chronic food security incidents also contributes to the public health challenge
472 in that region (Mwalwayo & Thole, 2016). Across Africa, the availability of data and information on
473 the level of incidence, public health importance, prevention and control of mycotoxins is limited for
474 both consumers and those working in the food supply chain (Gbashi et al. 2019). Therefore, raising
475 levels of awareness and promoting public education on the health implications of mycotoxins should
476 be addressed especially in African rural settings (Mupunga et al. 2017). This example serves to show
477 the systems level interaction between food safety standards setting in one country/region and then
478 food security and public health issues in another.

479 Food safety and protection of public health is a worldwide priority. There are several currently
480 available measures aimed at preventing and mitigating food safety incidents, including access to the
481 RASFF database for information. This database is freely available for food business operators. The
482 RASFF system is being used by different stakeholders firstly as an Early Warning Rapid Alert
483 (EWRA) system to mitigate the effects of trading hazardous products, and secondly at the same time,
484 as the basis for risk and vulnerability analysis within the agrifood chain. It is in this latter role where

485 caution should be exercised (Manning & Soon, 2019). Therefore, RASFF may be considered by some
486 stakeholders as both an ex ante and ex post measure for addressing food safety hazards and threats.
487 This means that depending on its role (ex ante or ex post) the rationale for its use will be different.
488 An EWRA can be described as: “a centralised hazard database or electronic network that provides a
489 platform for communication through which member states can alert each other about relevant hazards
490 that may be disseminated (in real time potentially)” (Marvin et al. 2009, p. 347). This definition
491 focusses on the communication aspects of an EWRA system in notifying of potential issues without
492 necessarily providing a quantification of risk. EWRA systems have also been described by the FAO
493 (2013, p. v) as: “systems that predict or detect issues (often outbreaks of disease) of potential serious
494 consequence early on in the epidemiologic curve. The rapid alert portion to the system provides
495 information to the public or key stakeholders in a quick fashion to allow for timely response to the
496 issue identified. These are generally associated with ongoing and known hazards and do not predict
497 potential emerging risks.” This definition also suggests that systems of this kind have a notification
498 role and not a role in quantifying risk. Thus, EWRA systems are distinctly different in both aims and
499 derived data from alternative foresight methodologies that seek to determine risk or vulnerability.

500 Horizon scanning is a forward-thinking methodology that can be generally applied to improve
501 either institutional planning or policy making where the focus is on potential future situations, hazards
502 or opportunities’ i.e. horizon scanning tools have properties which allow for forecasting and
503 prediction (FAO, 2013). This shows a clear distinction from between predictive methodological tools
504 and EWRA systems. However, as Bouzembrak and Marvin (2016) suggest, RASFF records can be
505 used to build a Bayesian Network (BN) model for effective prediction of risk and the use of BN can
506 support risk managers in their decision-making in both private and public organisations. Thus,
507 RASFF, as part of a wider predictive model, can play a role in horizon scanning for food safety
508 hazards, including mycotoxins.

509 In terms of an ex post measure, the RASFF system is a solid basis for surveillance of food
510 safety in Europe. The obligatory participation of the MSs in RASFF strengthens cooperation to

511 improve food supply chain integrity within a hybridised model of public and private actors delivering
512 food policy. However with regards to ex ante mechanisms, there are limitations in extrapolating from
513 the data in the RASFF system to identify levels of risk. Ex ante mechanisms for risk assessment and
514 for risk-based policy therefore need to utilise appropriate datasets, but also recognise their limitations
515 (Manning & Soon, 2019). The argument of this paper is drawn together in Figure 3 showing the
516 interaction between food security, food safety and food governance systems. Food security is affected
517 by affordability, availability, food quality and food safety as highlighted in the Global Food Security
518 Index. Affordability and availability of food is influenced, inter alia, by firstly, the level of food
519 production and the amount of import/export, and then the proportion of food loss or food waste in the
520 supply chain and/or domestic situation. The ability to deliver food in the supply chain that is of a
521 sufficient standard in terms of food safety and food quality will limit product non-compliance and
522 limit the lost calories associated with reuse, rework or rejection. What underpins food safety and food
523 quality and thus food security is effective food governance systems that can manage the food supply
524 chain and also minimise non-compliance, food loss and food waste.

525 Public regulatory systems sit at the heart of such governance for example the EU RASFF
526 system. Thus, RASFF data should be analysed objectively as regulatory sampling requirements
527 change over time and have a major impact on increased frequency of testing and also the purposive
528 sampling of some foodstuffs originating in selected countries. The impact of aflatoxin sampling
529 policy on RASFF performance shows that there is a need within a risk based regulatory approach for
530 a comprehensive knowledge and level of awareness amongst individuals in organisations driving their
531 strategic and operational decisions using this dataset. Another obstacle hindering analysis of RASFF
532 data is the presence of major variations among MSs in contributions to the RASFF database, thus as
533 some countries are represented far more fully than others, it is difficult to utilise the data for situational
534 (national) risk assessment. Despite the limitations described in this paper, the RASFF data is still a
535 vital basis for future legislative amendments e.g. the EU provisions regarding mycotoxins to protect
536 public health (Ledzion et al. 2010). It is imperative that every EU MSs ensures compliance and

537 appropriate testing regimes in their country, and if in the future private sampling data is utilised in
538 risk-based regulation that there is a clear protocol for how such data will be verified and used by
539 regulators. Some authors propose that some countries are much better gatekeepers of food safety than
540 others (Petróczi et al. 2010; Taylor et al. 2013). The national level anomalies identified in their work
541 include: (a) differences in border detection levels amongst MSs; (b) variance in contributions of
542 individual MSs to the RASFF database; and (c) variance in national arrangements of food control
543 systems (in accordance with “Official Control Regulation”). This creates the possibility for some
544 countries to become a “back door” for allowing some products to enter the common market of the
545 EU with the resultant free movement of food within the EU (Kowalska et al. 2019).

546 **6. Conclusion**

547 Food safety incidents influence the global population and economy; and national
548 arrangements for the safety of food and the integrity of food supply chains. Due to the purposive
549 sampling and major variations among MSs in their contribution to the RASFF database, care has to
550 be taken with using the RASFF data for predictive ex ante measures. The RASFF database is still a
551 valid EWRA and as such a source of information concerning food safety incidents. Such information
552 is crucial for elaboration of the national food control plans and underpinning risk-based regulation.
553 However, RASFF data trends should be interpreted with caution as food law regulation is changing
554 over time and purposive sampling has a major impact on increased checks and thus the potential of
555 detecting non-compliance.

556 When looking at food security, food integrity and food governance with respect to the global
557 dimension of food standards setting, the RASFF system is a useful mechanism for keeping European
558 citizens informed and safer. Due to the toxicity, carcinogenicity, and negative economic impact of
559 mycotoxin contamination, and as a potential marker for the impact of climate change on food safety
560 and food security, mycotoxins specifically are of academic interest, and can be used as a lens not only
561 to consider food safety but also public health and food security more generally. This study also

562 considers the wider food safety implications of raising market standards in a given trading area for
563 those countries seeking to export to that region. It is important to ensure that raising food safety
564 standards in the supply chain does not lead to public health implications for those communities that
565 are currently seemingly disconnected from such value chains. Negative externalities can arise, such
566 as product dumping of food rejected by the EU in a target country, and the implementation of value
567 chains for the export market leading to lower food safety standards in the food retained for local
568 consumption in the domestic market of the exporting country. This process occurs at a system level
569 rather than a simple linear cause-effect relationship and is worthy of further examination especially
570 as there is an increasingly market focused element to standards setting and governance.

571 **Word count:** 7650 excluding references

572

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853 This research did not receive any specific grant from funding agencies in the public, commercial, or
854 not-for-profit sectors.

855

Table 1. Key search terms in the study (Source: own elaboration)

Primary term	Secondary term
Aflatoxin AND	Contamination
Food AND	Traceability
Food fraud AND	RASFF
Food safety AND	Climate change
	Food security
	Nutrition AND security
	Mycotoxin
	RASFF
	Risk assessment
	Security
Fungal AND	Climate change
	Contamination
	Food security
	Risk assessment
Mycotoxin AND	Climate change
	Contamination
	Health
	Production
	Risk assessment

859 **Table 2. Actions identified in the RASFF database following notification being issued**
860 **over the period 01/01/2004-31/12/2018 (Source: own elaboration based on (RASFF Portal, 2019,**
861 **accessed 4 July 2019)).**

Action identified in the database	No. of cases (2004-2018)
Current action categories	
Re-dispatch	8784
Withdrawal from the market	5981
Destruction	5016
Official detention	3101
Recall from consumers	2946
Import not authorised	2194
Informing the authorities	1078
Informing the recipient(s)	1016
Retain to the consignor	1016
No action taken	951
Seizure	753
No stock left	665
Placed under customs seals	650
Withdrawal from the recipient(s)	554
Public warning – press release	416
Detained by the operator	313
Physical/chemical treatment	286
Informing the consignor	208
Relabelling	157
Use in feed	55
Use for another purpose than food/feed	35
Removal of offer online	6
Obsolete action categories	
Product recall or withdrawal	1591
Re-dispatch or destruction	920
Prohibition to trade – sales ban	347
Reinforced checking	242
Physical treatment - blanching	238
Destination of the product changed	106
Physical treatment – sorting	103
Destination of the product identified	80
Physical treatment – heat treatment	43
Prohibition to use	8
Physical treatment – freezing	3

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Table 3. No. of RASFF notifications *per hazard category* over the period 01/01/2004-

865

31/12/2018 (Source: own elaboration based on (RASFF Portal, 2019, accessed 4 July 2019))

Hazard category in RASFF	No of cases	%
Mycotoxins	9522	21.95
Pathogenic micro-organisms	5680	13.09
Pesticide residues	3949	9.10
Microbial contaminants (other)	3216	7.41
Food additives and flavourings	2637	6.08
Composition	2609	6.01
Metals	2528	5.83
Foreign bodies	1781	4.10
Adulteration/fraud	1267	2.92
Allergens	1209	2.79
Poor or insufficient controls	1431	3.30
Residues of veterinary medical products	1336	3.08
Organoleptic aspects	819	1.89
Parasitic infestation	652	1.50
Biological contaminants (other)	637	1.47
Novel food	590	1.36
Genetically modified food (GMO)	584	1.35
Environmental pollutants	554	1.28
Natural toxins (other)	371	0.86
Migration	369	0.85
Labelling absent/incomplete/incorrect	364	0.84
Packaging defective/incorrect	361	0.83
Radiation	361	0.83
Not determined/other	174	0.40
Industrial contaminants	121	0.28
Process contaminants	114	0.26
Feed additives	80	0.18
TSEs (Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies)	60	0.14
Chemical contaminants (other)	12	0.03

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Table 4. No. of RASFF notifications per food product category over the period 01/01/2004-

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
31/12/2018 (Source: own elaboration based on (RASFF Portal, 2019, accessed 9 July 2019))

Food product category	All hazards		Hazard category – mycotoxins	
	No of cases	% of the total number of RASFF notifications	No of cases	% of the total number of 'mycotoxins hazards'
Nuts, nut products and seeds	8588	20.36	6931	72.79
Fruits and vegetables	7305	17.32	1235	12.97
Herbs and spices	2494	5.91	757	7.95
Cereals and bakery products	2043	4.84	422	4.43
Cocoa and cocoa preparations, coffee and tea	731	1.73	59	0.62
Confectionary	795	1.88	27	0.28
Non-alcoholic beverages	450	1.07	18	0.19
Other food product/ mixed	366	0.87	17	0.18
Dietetic foods, food supplements and fortified foods	2191	5.19	16	0.17
Milk and milk products	803	1.90	15	0.16
Prepared dishes and snacks	554	1.31	12	0.13
Ices and desserts	100	0.24	4	0.04
Soups, broths and other condiments	586	1.39	4	0.04
Wine	35	0.08	2	0.02
Fats and oils	410	0.97	1	0.01
Fish and fish products	5193	12.31	1	0.01
Honey and royal jelly	271	0.64	1	0.01
Alcoholic beverages	85	0.20	0	0.00
Animal nutrition (obsolete)	3	0.01	0	0.00
Bivalve molluscs and products thereof	994	2.36	0	0.00
Cephalopods and products thereof	465	1.10	0	0.00
Crustaceans and products thereof	1512	3.58	0	0.00
Eggs and egg products	311	0.74	0	0.00
Food additives and flavourings	104	0.25	0	0.00
Food contact materials	545	1.29	0	0.00
Gastropods	43	0.10	0	0.00
Meat and meat products (other than poultry)	2523	5.98	0	0.00
Molluscs and products thereof (obsolete)	177	0.42	0	0.00
Natural mineral water	65	0.15	0	0.00
Poultry meat and poultry meat products	2390	5.67	0	0.00
Water for human consumption (other)	49	0.12	0	0.00
Total	42181	100	9522	100

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872 **Figure 1. Number of RASFF notifications related to mycotoxins over the period**
873 **01/01/2004-31/12/2018 including mycotoxins in nuts and seeds and border rejections (Source:**
874 **RASFF Portal, 2019)**




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
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878 **Figure 2. Overview of RASFF notifications related to mycotoxins by notifying country**
879 **over the period 2004-2018 (Source: RASFF Portal, 2019)**



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884 **Figure 3. Interaction between food governance systems, food safety and food security**
 885 **(Source: own elaboration)**

886